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Abstract
Many consumption goods have inherent attributes that are unknown
to both consumers and producers of the good. This is reflected for
example by the current discussion about potential harms of food prod-
ucts containing genetically modified organisms. The underlying pa-
per analyzes consumers’ demand for product tests in a surrounding of
symmetric but imperfect information. It is shown that the demand for
information of existing customers is higher than that of potential new
ones. In addition, the introduction of an information market unam-
biguously lowers the product price. This is true, even though expected
positive or negative quality news is symmetric in terms of monetary
valuation.
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1 Introduction
Consumers did not have a quiet time recently. Shortly after antibiotic-laden
meat has been detected, they learned that their well-beloved potato chips and
Corn-Flakes contain up to a hundred times the allowed amount of Acrylamid,
a carcinogenic substance. Even consumers of organically produced goods are
not protected from bad news as these. In a recent case in Switzerland, a
whole load of organic corn, which does not allow more than three percent of
genetically modified organisms (GMO), had to be removed from the shelves
after a higher share of these GMO has been discovered by Greenpeace. And
the whole branch of producers of organic meat in Germany fears for its
reputation - and the premium prices based on it - after above-critical-value
amounts of nitrofen, another carcinogenic substance, have been detected in
organic poultry. Fortunately, sometimes the news is good. Think about
how good wine consumers might feel after it has been detected that red
wine probably decreases the risk of getting Alzheimer’s disease. Or consider
aspirin which does not only ease a headache but has also the property of
decreasing the risk of a heart attack as was found out much later. Fact is
that consumers happen to receive news about the quality of some products
they consume - be it good or bad. And often, not even the producers of these
goods were aware of those quality attributes in advance. This is the basic
idea of the underlying paper.
We want to analyze a situation where consumers are only imperfectly
informed about the quality of the product they consume. Much has been
written about imperfectly informed consumers and quality signals. In many
cases, unobservable quality is signalled by means of prices whereas this is not
necessarily true, as is shown for example by Jones and Hudson [1994]. Wolin-
sky [1983] finds an equilibrium where prices exactly signal quality in a com-
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petitive surrounding. Cooper and Ross [1985] analyze a producer monopoly
where prices partly convey information about quality. In both models some
consumers receive costless information which is transmitted to the initially
uniformed via the firm’s optimizing behavior, the price mechanism respec-
tively. Riordan [1986] states that with repeated purchases - and the fact that
firms can commit to future prices - prices again perfectly signal quality. This
is due to a firm’s incentive to provide higher quality in order to retain repeat
purchases. In a similar context lies the analysis of high quality sustainment
with monitoring in a dynamic context by Liebi [2002].
Bester and Ritzberger [1998] present a model where consumers can buy
information about a product’s unobservable quality like in the underlying
paper. They find a mixed-strategy equilibrium with information-revealing
prices. Since information is costly, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists due
to the Grossman-Stiglitz [1980] paradox. It states that if prices are perfectly
informative no one would spend money to become informed. But if no one
gets informed, prices cannot be informative. In this case, it is worthwhile
buying information, prices will convey information and we are back where
we started.
To concentrate on consumers’ information gathering decision when in-
formation is costly, we impose exogenous quality and quality shocks. We
therefore analyze quality attributes that cannot be predicted even by the
producer, like in the examples given above. One of the most popular recent
examples is the GMO content in food products. Even if producers know
about GMO in their products, nobody is really able to predict wether GMO
in food is a harm or a benefit for consumers. This may only be found out
after several years of research. In the future, producers and consumers may
be surprised about both positive or negative news. By imposing symmetric
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information between producers and consumers, we not only abstract from
producers’ moral hazard concerning quality, but also prices are completely
uninformative with respect to quality and the only way for consumers to be-
come informed about a product’s true quality is by purchasing information
from a third party. This could be a consumer organization selling test results,
a newspaper or other media selling news to the public etc. In our framework
quality information is private, i.e., only those consumers who buy the test
know about the true quality.1 One may think of magazines and consumer
reports that have to be bought to obtain the desired information. Another
frequent example are Internet sites where only paying customers get access
to the test results.
We will observe a separation of consumers into several groups. Some will
prefer to remain uninformed, others will buy the test. Given expected quality
and no information market, there is always a group of consumers who either
should have bought the product and did not or vice versa. Clearly, a market
for test results decreases this kind of inefficiency by diminishing the number
of uninformed consumers.
Some consumers buy the test since they already buy the product and may
fear a quality loss. Others are interested in information since they would
buy the product if quality increased. Although the possible quality shock is
symmetric in terms of monetary valuation, information demand of these two
consumer groups is not. Interestingly, the demand for information is larger
for the group of consumers that used to buy the product given the level
of quality up to now. This group reacts sensitively to negative news, since
this might lead to their valuation of the product being lower than the price
1Alternatively, we can define one period in the analysis to last as long as it takes for
this private information to become public, e.g., by word-of-mouth recommendation.
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they have to pay. This higher demand may be a reason for the observation
that the media and consumer organizations seem to put more weight on
publishing bad news than good ones. This happens, although potential new
buyers of the product are willing to pay a price for information, too, given the
possibility that their valuation for the product increases above the product
price.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Consumers: Consumers value the product given a valuation function
v(q, θ) = qθ. q > 0 represents the product quality given all the informa-
tion up to the considered period, for example due to product tests in the last
period that were made public to all potential consumers. Since we want to
analyze the impact of good or bad news on consumer behavior, we assume
that this quality underlies changes unobservable to consumers. To keep the
model simple, we assume that true quality is either q + , representing good
news, or q −  in the opposite case, with  < q.
A consumer’s type is represented by θ, uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
We assume that all consumers have a higher valuation for higher quality
given their type, but might value the same quality differently.2 Consumers
buy one unit of the product if their valuation exceeds the price of the good,
represented by pg.
Production sector: The good is produced by a monopolist. To concen-
trate the analysis on the process of information gathering, we assume that
2This is why θ is sometimes called a taste parameter.
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quality cannot be influenced by the producer. Quality and possible quality
shocks are exogenous. This may represent discovering harmful substances
that were previously unknown or new positive effects of an already known
product. The firm produces the good and decides upon the product price
pg in order to maximize its expected profits. We assume that the producer
cannot change the price in the period where the test results are still private
information, be it because of time lags in reacting to market events, through
self-commitment, for contractual reasons etc.
Suppose that the producer could immediately react to the test results.
If it were optimal for him to charge different prices pg according to whether
quality news are good or bad, these prices would (perfectly) signal product
quality. Rational consumers could anticipate the producer’s optimizing be-
havior. Given that product prices signal the unknown quality, consumers
would have no incentive to pay for information in the first place. But if no
one gets informed, prices contain no information at all and consumers will
expect quality q, with a single optimal product price for the producer. Given
the non-informative price, however, some consumers prefer to buy tests be-
fore deciding to buy the product and we are back where we started. Hence,
no equilibrium - in pure strategies - exists. This situation is known as the
Grossman-Stiglitz-Paradox [1980]. If, as stated above, the producer cannot
change prices in the period where quality information is still private, we
are able to find an equilibrium where some consumers prefer to be informed
while others do not. To save on notation we assume zero marginal cost for
production.
Information sector: Finally, there is a producer of information. He is a
monopolist performing product tests and selling this information at a price
pi. By testing the product, the testing firm knows for sure the quality of
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the product. This information is private. Therefore, only consumers who
buy the test results will be informed about the true product quality, i.e., if
it is q +  or q − . We assume marginal costs of the test to be zero. This
emphasizes the idea that once information is produced - the testing results
are collected - it can be sold to any number of consumers who wish to buy
it.
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The producer sets the product price pg given (expected) quality q,
anticipating that consumers may buy information about its product
before they decide to buy the product itself.
2. The testing firm performs product tests and sets the price pi for every
consumer wishing to receive the information.
3. Given pg, pi and expected quality q consumers decide whether to buy
the information or not.
4. Based on their respective information, consumers will decide whether
to buy the product or not.
2.2 Demand Functions
Product Demand
A consumer of type θ buys the product, given expected quality q,3 if her
valuation of the product is at least as high as the price, i.e., if qθ ≥ pg. The
3Without further information consumers put equal weight to positive and negative
shocks, resulting in an expected quality of q.
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marginal consumer’s type therefore satisfies θˆ = pg/q and demand for the
good is represented by the function Dg(pg, q) = 1 − θˆ = 1 − pg/q. After a
positive or a negative quality shock, if observable, the marginal consumer’s
type is θ = pg/(q + ) or θ = pg/(q − ) respectively. Under complete
information and given product price pg, this leads to the demand function
Dg(pg, q, ) =


1− θ = 1− pg/(q + ) if news is good
1− θ = 1− pg/(q − ) if news is bad
Demand for Information
Given product price pg we can derive who has an incentive to buy infor-
mation about the product’s true quality. It is easy to see that the potential
demand for information consists of all consumers with type θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Lower
type consumers have a valuation of (q + )θ < (q + )θ = pg and will not buy
the product even if news is good. On the other hand, if their type exceeds
θ, consumers’ valuation of the product is higher than its price and they will
buy the product even if news is bad. In the following, we concentrate on
consumers with type θ ∈ [θ, θ].
To derive the demand for tests, we separate the consumers into two
groups. Consumers with type θ ≤ θ < θˆ would like to buy the product only
if quality is q+. Net benefit of such a consumer is (q+)θ−pg. Considering
the willingness to pay for information, the marginal consumer of information
- not to be mixed up with the marginal consumer of the product - has an
expected net benefit from buying a test of zero, i.e., 0.5[(q+)θi−pg]−pi = 0.
θi represents the type of the marginal consumer of information in the group
of consumers who only buy the product if quality news is good. Here, we
imposed that the informed consumer only buys the product if news is good,
which happens with an ex-ante probability of 0.5. In this group, the marginal
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consumer of information’s type is therefore
θi =
pi + 0.5pg
0.5(q + )
This leads to a demand for tests by potential new buyers of
D1i = θˆ − θi =
pg
q
− pi + 0.5pg
0.5(q + )
=
0.5pg− piq
0.5q(q + )
. (1)
This is the demand for tests of consumers who would not buy the product
if quality, or expected quality, of the product were q, but who would do
so if they knew that quality is q + . Some of them are willing to pay for
information to be sure about the quality of the product and - in case of good
news - to buy the product.
On the other hand, consumers with type θˆ ≤ θ ≤ θ buy the product if
expected quality is q or higher, but not if it is to q − . Their benefit from
buying a test is 0.5[pg−θ(q− )]−pi since they may avoid a loss from buying
a low quality product giving them a lower benefit than its cost. In the second
group, the marginal consumer of information’s type therefore is
θi =
0.5pg − pi
0.5(q − ) .
This leads to a demand for tests of these consumers of
D2i = θi − θˆ =
0.5pg − pi
0.5(q − ) −
pg
q
=
0.5pg− piq
0.5q(q − ) . (2)
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We notice that although the possible quality shocks are symmetric, this is
not true for the information demand of the two consumer groups. In fact
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it is always the case that D1i < D
2
i . Thus, consumers who are sensitive to
negative news, i.e., those that would buy the product if quality is as expected
but not if it is q − , have a higher demand for information than the other
group. This result is stated in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Information demand of existing customers who act upon
negative news about quality is always larger than information demand of po-
tential new customers who react to positive news.
In addition we notice that the demand for tests unambiguously increases
with the size of the quality shock for both consumer groups.4 This is intu-
itively clear, since it represents the fact that the more uncertainty there is,
the more valuable it is to get information.
Adding information demand for the two groups we derive the total de-
mand for tests to be
Di = D
1
i + D
2
i =
0.5pg− piq
0.25(q2 − 2) . (3)
As can be seen, the demand for tests increases with the product price. Intu-
itively, the higher is the product price, the more valuable product information
is, since more is at stake for the uniformed consumer. Similarly, Di increases
with the size of the quality shock. The higher is the possible change in quality,
the more an uniformed consumer has to lose, either by foregoing the chance
to buy a highly valued product or by overpaying the good.5 Finally, demand
for information decreases with the initial quality level, i.e., with expected
4Given that the demand for information is positive, i.e., given that pg > 2pi.
5The first statement refers to those consumers who would buy the product if informed
about quality, whereas the second refers to consumers who indeed do buy the product but
wouldn’t do so if informed.
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quality q. Given all else equal, especially the size of the quality shock, the
relative importance of this shock decreases with an increasing initial quality.
This lowers the need for information.
3 Determining the Equilibrium
Let us now derive the equilibrium prices and quantities of information and
product.
3.1 Information Sector
The monopolist supplier of tests faces a demand Di as derived in the last sec-
tion and has zero marginal costs of producing tests. He therefore maximizes
profits given by
πi = pi
(
0.5pg− piq
0.25(q2 − 2)
)
.
The profit-maximizing price for a test is
p∗i = 0.25
pg
q
(4)
leading to an equilibrium demand for tests of
D∗i =
pg
q2 − 2 . (5)
3.2 Product Demand
To derive the equilibrium demand for the product we have another look at
figure 1.
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We see that consumers can be separated into four groups. All consumers
with type θ < θi have a relatively low valuation of the product. They will
neither buy the test nor - given expected quality q - the product. Notice that
this may lead to too little trade relative to the full information case, since
all types θ < θ < θi value the product higher than its price if quality is high
and should therefore buy it.
Consumers with types θi ≤ θ < θˆ do not buy the product given expected
quality q. However, their valuation of the product is high enough to have an
interest in buying the test. If the test result indicates an increase in quality,
they will buy the product. Therefore, this is the group of potential new
customers who react sensitively to positive news.
Next, consumers with types θˆ ≤ θ ≤ θi buy the product given expected
quality q. Nevertheless, their valuation of the product is not high enough to
ignore the possibility of negative news. Thus, they buy the test and refrain
from buying the product if news about quality is bad. This is the group of
existing customers who react sensitively to negative news. As we have shown,
this group is always larger than the group of potential new customers.
Finally, there is the group of consumers with types θ > θi. They have a
relatively high valuation of the product such that they ignore the possibility
of bad news in their buying decision. They buy the product without buying
the test. Notice, that this can lead to too much trade relative to the full
information case, since all types θi < θ < θ value the product less than its
price if quality is low and should therefore not buy the product in this case.
If quality news is bad, all consumers who bought the test will not buy
the product. Therefore, the marginal consumer of the product has type θi.
The demand for the product in this case is
11
Dlg = 1− θi = 1−
0.5pg − pi
0.5(q − ) (6)
Evidently, product demand increases as expected quality q increases and
decreases as the size of the quality shock  increases. Interestingly, product
demand increases as the price for information increases. Intuitively, the more
expensive the tests are, the fewer consumers will buy them. In the case of
bad quality news this increases product demand relative to the case of more
informed consumers. Remembering the optimizing behavior of the informa-
tion monopolist in equation (4), we saw that the price for tests increases
with pg. This leads to the situation that by increasing the product price, the
producer can indirectly induce a positive effect on the product demand he
faces. The more expensive the good is, the more expensive the tests will be.
And if news is bad, the initial price increase had even a positive effect on
product demand.
Proposition 2 By increasing product price, the producer induces the testing
firm to increase the price for information. This in turn increases product
demand if quality news is bad because fewer consumers are informed .
On the other hand, if quality news is good, all the consumers that bought
the test will also buy the product. The marginal consumer of the product
has type θi and product demand is
Dhg = 1− θi = 1−
0.5pg + pi
0.5(q + )
(7)
Again, product demand increases with expected quality q but this time also
with increasing size of the quality shock , which is evident since we are
talking about a quality increase. The information price effect we found above
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is reversed here. The more expensive a test is, the fewer consumers will buy
it. Therefore, fewer consumers will know about the good news which would
cause them to buy the product.
Proposition 3 By decreasing product price, the producer induces the testing
firm to decrease the price for information. This in turn increases product
demand if quality news is good.
In his price setting decision, the producer thus has to take into account
these two opposing effects of increasing product price: in the case of bad
news it will increase product demand while it decreases it in the case of good
news. Appendix A presents a more detailed analysis of these price effects.
Direct price effects lead to a lower product demand by increasing product
price. Indirect price effects, via information prices, influence product demand
in opposing directions as is stated by propositions 2 and 3. The results are
stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The indirect effect in case of bad quality news always dom-
inates - in absolute values - the indirect effect if news is good. But indirect
effects are always dominated by the direct price effects.
3.3 Producer’s Optimizing Behavior
The producer acts as a leader in the sense that the information supplier will
adjust his price to the product price. As mentioned above, the producer has
to take into account the two possible - indirect - effects of his price setting
on product demand, in addition to the usual direct price effect. At the time
of price setting, the producer does not know whether news is good or bad,
therefore the two events are equally weighted in his optimization. He will, as
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uninformed consumers do as well, optimize his behavior given an expected
quality of q. Expected demand is
Deg = 0.5
(
1− 0.5pg − pi
0.5(q − )
)
+ 0.5
(
1− 0.5pg + pi
0.5(q + )
)
. (8)
Considering the information supplier’s price reaction in equation (4) and
simplifying (8) leads to
Deg = 1− pg
(
2q2 − 2
2q(q2 − 2)
)
. (9)
Maximizing expected profits pgD
e
g leads to the optimal product price
p∗g =
q(q2 − 2)
2q2 − 2 . (10)
The monopolist adjusts product price given expected quality q and quality
shock  such that expected product demand is constant at De
∗
g = 0.5.
Information demand in equilibrium is
D∗i =
q
2q2 − 2 . (11)
which is strictly smaller than 1, meaning that whatever prices and expected
quality, resp., quality shocks, there is always a fraction of consumers that
chooses to remain uniformed. Thus, although the introduction of an infor-
mation market eases the inefficiencies in trade as mentioned above, there
will always be too little or too much product purchases relative to the full
information case.
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4 Who Benefits from Introducing an Infor-
mation Market?
As was derived above, product demand in absence of an information market
- completely based on expected quality - is equal to 1− pg/q. This leads to a
product price in equilibrium of pg = q/2. This is unambiguously higher than
the equilibrium product price if there is an information market.
Proposition 5 The introduction of an information market unambiguously
lowers the product price even if possible quality shocks are symmetric in size
and probability.
The producer’s fear of losing consumers after bad news is stronger than
the hope for good news to increase demand. The producer therefore lowers
its price to reduce the number of informed consumers6. Consumers who buy
information thus exert a positive externality on those consumers who buy the
product without buying the test. Note, that the cause of this externality is
not that prices now reflect information - they do not. The mere anticipation
that consumers may become informed leads the producer to lower the price.
Product price is lowest if all potential consumers, i.e., all types in [θ, θ],
are informed. From equation (11) we know that this is not the case in
equilibrium. The fraction of informed consumers is strictly smaller than 1.
The price-cutting effect of an information market does not fully apply.
All consumers with type θ ≥ θi unambiguously benefit from the introduc-
tion of an information market. Given expected quality they buy the product
at a lower price without buying the test.
6Remember that the demand for information increases with product price, see equa-
tion (5).
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For consumers with types θ ≤ θi nothing changes since they do not buy
the test and - given expected quality q - neither the product.
Consumers with type θ ∈ [θi, θˆ]7 have an expected benefit from introduc-
ing an information market of
1
2
[θ(q + )]− pi,
which is strictly positive given the equilibrium price for information in equa-
tion (4).8
On the other hand, consumers with type θ ∈ [θˆ, θi]9 have an expected
benefit from introducing an information market of
q
2
− 1
2
[pg + θ(q − )]− pi,
which is strictly positive considering equation (4) and (10).10
Therefore, also consumers that do buy the test strictly benefit from the
introduction of an information market. This is true even though the marginal
consumers of information are indifferent between buying and not buying the
test. The results are summarized in proposition (6).
7Those who would not buy the product if there is no possibility to buy tests, i.e., those
who react to positive quality news.
8It is even strictly positive for the marginal consumer of information, who is indifferent
between buying the test or not, once the information market has been installed.
9Those who buy the product if there no possibility to buy tests, i.e., those who react
to negative quality news.
10The consumer with the highest type in this group, θi, is just indifferent between buying
the test or not. She strictly benefits from the price decline. All other consumers in this
group benefit even more since buying the test delivers them a positive utility.
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Proposition 6 All consumers, those who buy the test and those who buy
only the product, strictly benefit from the introduction of an information mar-
ket. The rest of the consumers is unaffected.
5 Conclusion
It is not unusual that consumers receive news about products they knew and
consumed for a long time. These news may be good or bad. Sometimes
even the producers are surprised about their products having these hitherto
unknown properties.
In this paper we analyze the decision of consumers to buy information
about product quality attributes that are otherwise unobservable to them.
We therefore consider a monopolist who offers a product of an exogenously
given expected quality on which his price decision is based. Consumers know
that quality may be different from their expectation and have the possibil-
ity to buy product tests before purchasing the product itself. Given that
consumers have heterogenous preferences for quality we observe a separation
into several groups.
Interestingly, present consumers of the product, i.e., those who will re-
act to negative news, have a strictly larger demand for tests than potential
new consumers although quality shocks are completely symmetric. A second
interesting finding is that product price is strictly lower if an information
market exists. Although not all consumers decide to buy the test, the mere
possibility that consumers become informed leads the producer to lower his
price. By doing so, he lowers consumers’ incentives to become informed
which in turn will lead to a higher demand in the case of bad quality news.
By lowering the price the producer also lowers demand in the case of good
17
news. But this is accepted to avoid the - more feared - loss of demand in the
opposite case.
We conclude by stating that the introduction of a market for tests is a
Pareto improvement for consumers. Those who never buy the product given
their low valuations are not affected, while all others strictly benefit.
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Appendix
Direct and Indirect Price Effects
Analyzing product demand we found that an increase in product price
influences product demand in two ways. First, there is a direct effect. If
the product becomes more expensive, consumers will want to buy less. But
there is a second effect. If the product is more expensive, so is the test by
the optimizing behavior of the testing firm, see equation (4). This means less
consumers will decide to become informed. This tends to increase product
demand if quality news is bad and to decrease product demand if quality
news is good. Let us analyze this more formally.
According to the kind of quality news, product demand can be represented
for two cases, as done in equations (6) and (7),
Dlg = 1− θi = 1−
0.5pg − pi
0.5(q − ) (6)
and
Dhg = 1− θi = 1−
0.5pg + pi
0.5(q + )
. (7)
The effect of an increase in the product price on product demand in case of
bad quality news is
∂Dlg
∂pg
= − 1
0.5(q − )(0.5−
∂pi
∂pg
)
= − 1
(q − ) +

2q(q − ) , (12)
where the derivative of pi with respect to pg results from the profit maximiz-
ing behavior of the information monopolist summarized in equation (4).
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The effect of an increase in the product price on product demand in case of
good quality news is
∂Dhg
∂pg
= − 1
0.5(q + )
(0.5 +
∂pi
∂pg
)
= − 1
(q + )
− 
2q(q + )
. (13)
The first terms after the equation signs in equations (12) and (13) represent
the direct price effect, whereas the second terms represent the indirect effects.
First, we notice that the direct effects are larger in absolute values than
the respective indirect effects in both cases. Second, the indirect effect in the
case of negative quality news is larger in absolute value than if news is good.
Finally, although the direct price effect in the case of bad news is larger, the
total effect of a price increase on demand is smaller if quality news is bad,
i.e.,
∂Dlg
∂pg
<
∂Dhg
∂pg
.
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